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1. Professor Norman Levine's contribution
Broad in scope, highly condensed in content, Professor Norman Levine’s recent book, Marx’s Dis-
course with Hegel will surely attract many scholars of Marx, especially those interested in the rela-
tionship between Marx and Hegel.
The subject of the relationship between Marx and Hegel first emerges when Marx stated his
debts to Hegel in a footnote in the value form in both the first edition of Book One [Erster Band] as
well as in the Afterword to the second edition of Book One of Capital . Lenin’s aphorism in his
Philosophical Notebook that nobody can understand Marx’s Capital without reading Hegel’s Logic
has thrown further light on the nature the relationship. The present reviewer will refrain from com-
menting on the historiography on the relationship and will focus on Professor Levine’s ambitious
work.
1−1. The most important contribution that Professor Levine makes is in his clear comprehensive
bibliographic information on Hegel’s works (a) that Marx referred and (b) that he did not ; Hegel’s
works (b−1) that Marx did not access in spite of being possible and (b−2) that have been published
after his death. Needless to say, Hegel’s works of (b−2) are omitted from the Marxist scholarship
on the relation between Marx and Hegel.
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Professor Levine attaches great importance to Hegel’s works of (a) and (b−1), especially to the
latter. Witnessing Hegel’s works (a) to that Marx accessed in each work from his dissertation, via
The Holy Family, to The German Ideology and in his personal library. Professor Levine thinks that
Marx owes his intellectual development very much to Hegel. However, Marx has rarely cited di-
rectly Hegel’s texts ; rather Marx has sometimes been critical against Hegel, for instance, in The
Holy Family or The Poverty of Philosophy. In such a context, Marx seems as if he were a disobedient
student of Hegel. Something must be hidden in Marx’s textual methodology.
1−2. Professor Levine’s second contribution concerns his re−setting of the origin of Marx’s intellec-
tual development, which is traditionally dated from 1843 Autumn in Paris. Professor Levine focuses
instead on Germany in 1837, when Marx was writing his doctoral dissertation ‘On the difference be-
tween the Democritean and Epicurean philosophy of nature’, and his preparation in 1840−41. The
dissertation has been rather out of focus of Marx scholarship.
1−3. The third point to mention as of importance is that Prof. Levine shows where correlations be-
tween Marx and Hegel are traceable, or where Marx is uncorrelated with Hegel even on the same
subject. Regrettably, Prof. Levine gives only a few citations from Marx, so that the readers must see
Marx through Levine’s framework in order to contrast Marx and Hegel. The present reviewer
would now like to express several critical remarks regarding Professor Levine’s work. The discus-
sion in the present review article rather concerns in details and is comparatively controversial in or-
der to match Prof. Levine’s mighty ceaseless inquiry into what Marx did think.
The reviewer wonders if it is necessarily true as Professor Levine argues that Marx sometimes
misunderstood Hegel. Marx’s texts on Hegel are rather de facto projection by Marx of his own
problematic. That is naturally different from the original context. Marx has already attained his own
methodology as early as his doctoral dissertation that reverses thinker’s intended systematization in
order to reveal a rational kernel unconsciously hidden within. The reviewer puts a search light into
Marx’s own texts to trace Marx’s problematic that continues from the 1841 doctoral dissertation, via
The Paris Manuscripts, to Capital , referring Hegel’s works that Marx did read in his life time, won-
dering whether or not Marx scholars really know and understand Marx, or misunderstand, even
though Marx’s access to Hegel’s works is limited as Prof. Levine proves. Would Marx have changed
his own view of Hegel, had he had access to those texts that he really did not?
2. What is the main attainment in Marx's Doctoral Dissertation?
2-1. Marx's projection of his own problematic on Hegel's texts
Professor Norman Levine inquires into Marx’s alleged misunderstanding of Hegel, as if Marx
himself has always been understood correctly. Marx remains his audiences some particular hin-
drance against correct reading his texts, especially, his published text of critique of political econ-
omy.
In his letter of 22nd February and 31st May of 1858 to F. Lassalle (MEW, vol. 29, p.551, p.560),
Marx writes that he used to condense (kondensieren) content in his own description. Marx takes
strategy to conceal (verstecken) content against Proudhonism (MEW, vol.30, p.207). The two ways of
condensing and concealment hinder from our understanding of Marx’s texts, especially his pub-
lished critique of political economy. Further, Marx’s economic concept has complex structure, as
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shown later in [4−2].
Moreover, Marx reads text, including Hegel’s, from his own standpoint. In his 1841 doctoral dis-
sertation, Marx had already established his own methodology to utilize text as follows.
‘Its [historiography’s] concern is to distinguish in each system the determinations themselves,
the actual crystallizations that pervades the whole system, from the proofs, the justifications in
argument, the self−presentation of the philosophers as they know themselves ; to distinguish
the silent, persevering mode of real philosophical knowledge from the voluble, exoteric, vari-
ously behaving phenomenological consciousness of the subject which is the vessel and motive
force of those elaborations’ (MEGA2, IV/1, p.695 ; MECW, vol.1, p.506).
Marx does not read texts as an obedient student who just follows his master’s way of writing.
Marx’s methodology focuses on ‘the actual crystallizations pervading the whole system’ of which
most philosophers are usually unconscious ; rather their subjective intellectual interests rest on
other aspects.
Though Prof. Levine writes of Marx’s de−linkage from Hegel, ‘The years 1843 to 1844 are the
borders of Marx’s delinking from Hegel’ (Levine, p.180), the break can be traced two years earlier
in 1841 (or three years earlier in 1840) in the appendix of his doctoral dissertation, where Marx had
already criticized Hegel on religion, and writing,
‘Hegel interpreted the conclusion from the world to God as meaning ; ‘‘Since the accidental
does not exist, God or Absolute exists.’’ However, the theological demonstration is the oppo-
site : ‘‘Since the accidental has true being, God exists.’’ God is the guarantee for the world of
the accidental.’ (MEGA2, I/1, p.90 ; MECW,vol.1, p.103−104)
‘The accidental’ above concerns Kant’s antinomy 3 in his Critique of Pure Reason where he in-
quires in to whether the universe is subjectively free (that is, objectively accidental) or naturally de-
termined. Interestingly from the viewpoint of the formation in Capital , Marx criticizes Kant who ar-
gues the universality of religion, as follows,
‘Kant’s example [of ‘one hundred Taler’ in his Critique of Pure Reason] 1 might have enforced
the ontological proof. Real Talers have the same existence that the imagined gods have. Has a
real Taler any existence except in the imagination, if only in the general or rather common
imagination of man? Bring paper money into a country where this use of paper money is un-
known, and everyone will laugh at your subjective imagination. Come with your gods into a
country where other gods are worshiped, and you will be shown to suffer from fantasies and
abstractions.’ (MEGA2, I.1, p.90 ; MECW, vo.1, p.104 ; bold letter citor).
Marx treats both god and money as relative existences in space, inquiring into why multitudes
believe in such validity−limited existences as absolute, and why philosophers including Hegel en-
gage in the justification of the absolute existence of God, just as bourgeois economists who justify
money or presuppose its natural undeniable existence. Marx will soon shift to the critical analysis of
money in his critique of political economy from autumn 1843 in Paris by way of the article ‘The Jew-
ish Question’ in The German−French Annual . In The Paris Manuscripts, he writes, ‘Hegel’s stand-
point is that of modern political economy.’ (MECW, vol. 3, p.333) and ‘The Logic ― money of spirit,
the speculative, the value of thought of man and nature (Die Logik ― das Geld des Geistes, der
1 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft , Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1971, p.572 (A599 ,B627) ; Critique of
Pure Reason, trans. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Dover Publications, Inc., 2003, p.335−336.
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spekurative, der Gedankenwert des Menschen und Nature)’ (ibid., p.330 ; translation altered).
Eighteen years later, Marx recognizes the same reading way in his letter of May 31st 1858 to
Ferdinand Lassalle (1825−1864).
‘Even in case of those philosophers who give their works systematic form, for instance Spinoza,
the real inner structure of his system is entirely different from the form in that he consciously
describes.’ (MEW, vol. 29, p.561)
Such a textual reading text by Marx, including of Hegel, is neither a misreading nor a misunder-
standing. It is surprising that the young Marx just twenty−two years old in 1840 had already formed
his own critical methodology of critically reading texts. The cited next statement in his Afterword to
the second German edition of Capital that Levine quotes in his Marx’s Discourse with Hegel (p.298)
must be understood in the sense of the letter cited above that again confirms Marx’s own methodol-
ogy that now works on Hegel’s dialectic itself.
‘The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from be-
ing the first to present its general form of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner.
With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would dis-
cover the rational kernel within the mystical shell’ (Das Kapital , Erster Band, Dietz Verlag
Berlin, 1962, p.27 ; Capital , vol. 1, trans. by S. Moore and E. Aveling, ed. by F. Engels, Pro-
gress Publishers, Moscow 1965, p.20).
2-2. Marx's direct studies of original texts of the ancient Greek natural philosophers, Aristotle
and Spinoza
[Aristotle’s De Anima] Marx’s critical textual analysis works, not only on the Ancient Natural Phi-
losophers of Democritus and Epicurus, but also on Aristotle’s De Anima and Spinoza’s A Theologico
−political Treatise (see MEGA2, IV/1, p.155ff, p.233ff).
Prof. Levine discusses Aristotle’s ‘On the Soul’ (De Anima), referring to Hegel’s History of Philoso-
phy, as follows,
‘It is vital to my argument to note that Marx read Hegel’s History of Philosophy and that Marx
knew this extended commentary by Hegel on Aristotle. Marx at least read, although he later
overlooked, Hegel’s respect materialism’ (Levine, p.281).
However, the fact we have in MEGA2 is entirely different. Although Marx probably had come to
know Aristotle’s De Anima by reading Hegel’s History of Philosophy, Marx also read De Anima , in-
dependent of what Levine calls Hegel’s ‘materialism’ context, and he took notes to the effect that he
did not start from the head on De Anima , but from the last part on nous just after on phantasia
(imagination or Einbildung) from his own ‘truth−falsehood’ problematic in connection to his critique
of Kant’s epistemology, discussed below.
MEGA2 documents this fact (see MEGA2, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1976, IV/1, pp.155−182). Marx in-
quires into what determines truth or falsehood, relating Kant’s parallogism that human reason (Ver-
nunft) may reverse ‘ideality’ into ‘reality’ in the same way of Descartes thesis, cogito ergo sum : here
cogito (I think) is the transcendental Subject that is just ideal par excellence, sum (I exist) signifies
real existence. Descartes reverses ideal cogito (I think) into real sum (I exist) by means of ergo
(therefore) : ergo is ‘fallacy of ambiguous middle’ (Kant). Marx comments in his note of Aristotle’s
De Anima .
‘It is entirely correct from every viewpoint when Aristotle declares that synthesis [connection]
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is the ground of all falsehood. Representing or reflecting thought is generally a synthesis [con-
nection] of being and thought, that of generality (die Allgemeinheit) and individuality (die Ein-
zelheit), and that of semblance [Schein] and essence [Wesen]. Then, further all incorrect
thoughts exist as well as incorrect representation, consciousness etc. of synthesis of such de-
terminations that do not belong to each other, being external in themselves, and are not imma-
nent relationship of objective and subjective determinations’ (MEGA, IV/1, p.164 : English
translation citor).
Further in the note on De Anima , Marx comments as follows.
‘Generally, just in the same way that cho¯rista ta pragmata (thing [Sache] is separable), or thing
[Sache] exists in and for itself from matter [Materie], (that is, things [Dinge] in themselves
are separated from matter, or are separable through abstraction), thus behaves what are
for nous ’ (ibid., S. 163 : bold letter, ( ) original).
Nous separated from essence speculates to fall in falsehood, but nous that is itself essential is
true. Interestingly, in his doctoral dissertation, Marx uses the term ‘imaging understanding (der
imaginierende Verstand)’ (MEGA2, I, p.17), probably based on the second (B) edition of Kantian
Critique of Pure Reason where he connects Imagination with Understanding, changing the definition
in the first (A) where imagination is most basic that gives rise both of sense and understanding.
[Set concepts of Alienation and reification] In his doctoral dissertation, Marx asks what sepa-
rates a thing (Sache) into parts and what connects these parts in reified form, as for instance with
religion. A thing (Sache) that a person has produced may become independent from them unexpect-
edly. Marx names the situation ‘alienation (Entfremdung) and reification (Versachlichung)’. The
separated (alienated) things are not always connected so that recovers the original form ; rather it
takes false form which maintains the cause of the separation (alienation). In The Paris Manuscripts
Marx calls this ‘supersession (Aufhebung) within alienation’. What motivates Marx in the doctoral
dissertation to research the most basic cause of truth or falsehood? It is the cause of religion and
money (MEGA2, I/1, p.90) : both will be his life time subject, continuing strongly connected.
Though Marx’s shifts from a critique of religion to that of political economy, this does not signify
that he abandons his critique of religion, but rather a further inquiry into false consciousness.
The key words here in his study of De Anima are cho¯rismos (separation, Trennung) and synthe¯sis
(connection, Verbindung). Thing may arbitrarily be separated and is connected through social ab-
straction. Marx uses the term ‘alienation (Entfremdung)’ to refer to separation, and reification (Ver-
sachlichung) to refer to a false connection of the separated or alienated. Alienation and reification
themselves are not material concept, but are relational par excellence. Reification is never ‘an ex-
treme form of alienation’ to the same direction. On the contrary, it is material phenomenon of an al-
ienated connection. The concept of alienation and reification will be key words in the formation of
Capital ; both also appear in the Grundrisse,
‘It is clear to the economists that the existence of money presupposes the reification (Versachli-
chung) of the social connection’ (MEGA2, IV/1.1, p.93) ; ‘Money is reified medium.…Individuals
have alienated (entfremdet) their own social relationship from themselves’ (ibid., p.99 ; italics citor)
2-3. Marx's critique of Kantian epistemology
Marx microscopically searches into fragments of the Ancient Greek Natural Philosophers, De-
mocritus (460?−370? B.C.) and Epicurus (341?−270 B.C.), in order to confirm that Kantian epistemol-
Whether Marx’s Misunderstanding of Hegel’s Texts, or Marx’s Projection of his own Problematic on them?
21
ogy can not adequately recognize the cause of religion and money.
Kantian epistemology consists of sense (Sinnlichkeit), understanding (Verstand) and reason (Ver-
nunft). Marx reveals that the three elements had already been separated as such by both Democri-
tus and Epicurus, about twenty−one hundred years before the first publication of Kant’ Critique of
Pure Reason in 1781.
Democritus rejects sense as unreliable and seeks objects of understanding , leaving his home for
further empirical facts, and lastly comes to recognize his own ignorance. While Epicurus is confi-
dent of sensuous experience and is satisfied with what he comes to know by sense, indifferent to
think by understanding.
Both of them think that the atom is conceivable only with reason .
Therefore, the three moments of Kantian epistemology of sense, understanding and reason are
separated by both philosophers, and the moments are differently ; sense is affirmative to Epicurus,
negative to Democritus ; understanding is affirmative to Democritus, negative to Epicurus ; and for
both of them, reason is separated from sense and understanding and is only active in conception of
atom, most abstract being.
Marx treats Kant with great irony. While Prof. Levine introduces Study of Hegel by Rosenkranz,
Introduction to Hegelian philosophy, Marx read Rosenkranz’ History of Kantian Philosophy (see
MEGA2, IV/1, p.277−288) and makes a joke about Rosenkranz, writing ‘The Kantian, on the con-
trary, are as it were the appointed priests of ignorance, their daily business is to tell their rosaries
(Rosenkranz) over their own powerlessness and the power of things.’ (MECW, vol.1, p.428−429 ;
MEGA2, IV/1, p.619). ‘Rosenkranz’ here signifies a double function, the philosopher and the rosary
of student faithful to the Master Kant. Marx was never any obedient student of any master in his
life time.
2-4. Kantian four antinomies in Marx's note for the Doctoral Dissertation
It is very noteworthy that the first of seven notes that Marx took in the preparation of his doctoral
dissertation includes the following sentences which evidence his interest in the four antinomies of
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason . That proves that one of Marx’s main themes of the doctoral disserta-
tion is critique of Kantian antinomies.
As to Antinomy 1 (whether there is beginning in time and limit in space, or not), the first note
reads,
‘The universe is unlimited by reason of the multitude of bodies and the extent of the void.’
(MEGA2, IV.1, p.17 ; MECW, vol. 1, p.411 : bold citor)
As to Antinomy 2 (whether universe constitutes of part or it is just whole),
‘Since they [atoms] have a certain size, there must be something smaller then they are. Such
are the parts of which they are composed. But these are necessarily to be considered together
as permanent community’ (MEGA2, IV/1, p.19 ; MECW, p.412 ; [ ] citor).
As to Antinomy 3 (whether human being is free or is determined by natural necessity),
‘Necessity, which has been introduced by some as the ruler over all things, is not the ruler , he main-
tains, over that some of which depends on chance and some on our arbitrary will. Necessity is not
subject to persuasion ; chance , on the other hand, is inconstant. But our will is free’ (MEGA2, IV
/1, p.13, Apparat, IV/1, p.600 ; MECW, p.408 ; italics original).
Antinomy 4 (whether there is absolute necessary being [God] or not),
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‘Gods verily there are. For the notion of them is evident. .....Not the man who denies the gods
worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believe about them
is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions,
but false assumptions.’ (MEGA, IV/1, p.11−12 ; MECW, p.406 ; italics original)
Marx’s solution to the antinomies is that atom supersedes (aufhebt) these four antinomies. The
first two antinomies are similar in that they articulate a contradiction between finiteness and infinity.
As Kant argues that if there is a beginning in time, something must be before the beginning, and in
the same way, if there is a limit in space, there must be something beyond it. To set a beginning or
a limit is to give rise contradiction between finiteness and infinity that Kant calls ‘semblance of rea-
son (Schein der Vernunft)’. However, Marx argues that the people’s daily lives are trapped in the
appearance of religion or money as infinity. The theoretical task is thus to analyze the cause and
structure of such appearances.
Atom is unity of both, being finiteness that holds infinity, because atom includes other atoms eter-
nally and is included within other atom. Atom is a set that includes other atoms as element and is
element as being included within other atom. A human being has by nature an atomistic way of
thinking in the sense above. As will be commented upon later (see [4−4]), commodity at the head
of Capital is atom in modern economic form. Commodity is simultaneously set of huge commodities
and its element . Commodity is economic atom that gives rise birth of money.
In the first antinomy of his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant argues,
‘An infinite time must be regarded as having passed away in the enumeration of all co−existing
things. However, that is impossible. For this reason, an infinite aggregate of actual things
(ein unendliches Aggregat der wirklicher Dinge) cannot be considered as a given whole,
consequently, not as a contemporaneously given whole’ 2
Marx criticizes Kantian rejection of coexistence of what is next to one another and what is one af-
ter the other, writing in the 1859 Critique of Political Economy,
‘In the actual process of circulation, C−M−C presents itself as infinite accidental of what is next
to one another and what is one after the other (als unendlich zufälliges Nebeneinander und
Nacheinander) of miscellaneous linkage of the various total metamorphoses. The actual circula-
tion of commodity appears …as a simple set (als bloßes Aggregat) of many purchases and
sails that coexist as what is next to one another and what is one after the other’ (MEW, vol.13,
p.75 ; bold letter citor).
Evidently, Marx’s Critique here implies against Kantian Critique. The reason why Marx affirms
the coexistence of ‘Nebeneinander and Nacheinander’ is founded on recognition that trader’s ideal
decision−making establishes contract of commodity exchange. Purchase of commodity and its sail
are done simultaneously in one moment. Even though two traders exist on the reverse sides on the
globe, their trade is done at the moment when offer is accepted. The exchange takes no time in the
mind of the traders. Trade establishment is ideal in instant, but the carrying out takes real time that
costs. Therefore, shortening of the real time is ultimate imperative for trader. That causes develop-
ment of highly rapid system of communication and transportation. Marx’s Grundrisse describes such
movement in ‘II Particularity of Capital’. Capital hastens the so−called ‘the great civilizing influence
2 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft , Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1971, p.455 (A429, B457) ; Critique of Pure
Reason, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Dover Publications, Inc., 2003, p.242 ; bold letter citor.
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of capital’ in that context.
Money is thus the central problem since Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation. Marx’s conclusion of the
study is that atom is media that supersedes Kantian antinomies. The concept of atom is media to
settle the antinomies through simultaneously being ‘set and element’, just the same way capitalist
money supersedes in form of commodity capitalist separation between man and nature, or labor and
means of production including land.
3. The Paris Manuscripts reconsidered with Marx's notes of A. Smith's Wealth
of Nations
3-1. Does philology of Marx's writings bring high wall against theoretical analysis?
Prof. Levine declares that he shifts his subject of Marx study from framework of The 1844 Manu-
scripts of Paris and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit to that of Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Science of
Logic. Broadly, the present commentator shares with Levine’s project on condition that Marx’s cri-
tique of political economy is made clear based on its original context.
Surprisingly, Professor Norman Levine estimates the limit of The Economic−philosophic Manu-
scripts of 1844 published in MEGA2, writing,
‘‘‘The Manuscripts’’ were not generalizations, they were not introductions to Marx’s later sys-
tem. It is a distortion of ‘‘The Manuscripts’’ to read them as a totality, as a propaedeutic to his
mature theory of social development.’ (Levine, p.205)
Those theoretical limitations of ‘The Manuscripts’ is hard to justify when careful traces are carried
on the philological evidences of Marx’s study of political economy in 1843−44.
In the Third Manuscripts, Marx wrote, ‘Hegel’s Logic is money of spirit’. That signifies that Marx
had already begun the project of the critique of National (Political) Economy in light of Hegel’s Sci-
ence of Logic.
3-2. Marx's unique way of taking notes of A, Smith's Wealth of Nations
More importantly, Marx had taken two times notes of A. Smith’s Wealth of Nations, firstly in such
a particular order : starting from Chapter One of Book One to Chapter Two, Three, Four, Five, Six,
Seven, and after citing a few starting sentences of Chapter Eight, Marx (seemingly suddenly)
jumped to Chapter Two of Book Two, passing over most of all Chapter Eight, all of Nine, Ten and
Eleven. Notably, Marx focuses on paragraph on money in Chapter Two of Book Two. And then,
Marx changes the style of taking notes, putting the following eight titles with citations related with
each subject.
I. Wage of labor (MEGA2, IV/2, p.346)
II. Profit of capital (ibid., p.349)
III. Wage and profit in various employments (ibid., p.351)
IV. Rent of land (ibid., p.353)
V. On different two parts in which fund divides itself (ibid., p.357)
VI. On accumulation of capital, or on the productive and unproductive labor (ibid., p.360)
VII. On fund that is laid on interest (ibid., p.360)
VIII Different employment of capital (ibid., p.361)
The titles indicate that Marx then already had distinct problematic of the critique of political econ-
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omy. The first half part of The First Manuscripts is divided into three parts, wage, profit and rent
that correspond exactly to the above of ‘I. Wage of labor’, ‘II. Profit of capital’, ‘III. Wage and profit
in various employments’, and ‘IV. Rent of land’. It is noteworthy that Marx fills all the three columns
of Page VI with the citations related only with wage. That utilization indicates that capital and land−
property derive profit and land−rent from ‘surplus value’. Marx already uses in his note of Wealth of
Nations (WN) the term ‘Mehrwerth’ (MEGA, IV/2, S.362) in the sense of Das Kapital .
3-3. Marx's note of Wealth of Nations and The Paris Manuscripts
The above title ‘III Wage and profit’ corresponds to Chapter Ten of Book One of WN that in-
quires the relationship between wage−labor and capital on that Marx analyzes in pages from XIII to
XVI of the First Manuscript. Thus, from the beginning of The Paris Manuscripts, Marx started the
systematic critique of political economy. The investigation of the relationship of the three revenues
is the prototype of ‘The Trinity formula’ of Book Three of Das Kapital.
In the half last part of so called ‘Alienated Labor’, Marx grasps alienated labor in four definitions
from viewpoint of wage laborer.
(1) Alienation of laborer from product of labor
(2) Alienation of labor in production process
(3) Alienation from species life (or Gattungsleben )
(4) Alienation of man with each other (or destruction of primitive community)
Definition (1) is the result of the process of capitalist production. Definitions (3) and (4) are
prepositions of capitalist production of (2) and, then notably, definitions (3) and (4) are the same
with definition (1). All definitions are chained with each other as circular process, or capitalist repro-
duction that corresponds to Chapter Three of Book Two of WN , or the title above VI. Here in The
Paris Manuscripts, reproduction is not divided into two parts as in Part Three of Book One and Part
Three of Book Two of Capital . The theoretical distinction becomes clear in The 1861−63 Manu-
scripts ; that distinction is influential for Marx to reconsider the most abstract relationship between
value−form and exchange−process that is shown in the first German edition of Book One of Capital
in 1867.
When Marx encounters theoretical fission between Chapter Five on simple commodity and Chap-
ter Six on commodity capital of Book One of WN , he soon leaps to Chapter Two of Book Two on
capital money. The shift signifies that he finds the problem of realization of commodity capital into
capital money [(C’―M’) in process of (C―M―C(Lp+Pm)…P…C’―M’] in comparison with (C―M).
However, the problem is conditioned on two aspects of competition and social reproduction amongst
many capitals. Which ordering is correct, from competition to reproduction, or from reproduction to
competition?
The problem catches his theoretical analysis not only in the Grundrisse, but in The 1861−63
Manuscripts and The 1863−65 Manuscripts, especially in ‘The Third Section Commodity as Product
of Capital’ of ‘Chapter Six Results of Immediate Process of Production’ of the latter Manuscripts.
The year 1844 Paris is decisive, setting the starting line for his life time long investigation into the
appropriate system of critique of political economy. The notes of WN by A. Smith and Elements of
Political Economy by James Mill are to use in the Grundrisse. Marx evidently writes the Grundrisse,
referring The Paris Manuscripts and the notes. He is problematically persistent throughout his life
time.
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In its basic order of The Paris Manuscripts, the Aristotelian analytical method works from con-
crete forms to abstract one, through de−mediating into the most immediate form. Marx’s project
here is an inquiry into the reverse order of description (or presentation) of his forthcoming critique
of political economy after The 1847 Poverty of Philosophy. The Paris Manuscripts is thus basically
method−organized.
Dr. Jürgen Rojahn’s philology of The Paris Manuscripts provides exact information. Referring to
Rojan’s study, the late Ryuji Yamanaka, one of the Japanese Marx scholars, edited on his own edito-
rial idea the manuscripts in the title of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts in such order from the First Manu-
scripts, via Commentaries on James Mill, to the Second and to the Third in Japanese translation
(Ochanomizushobo, Tokyo, 2005). He did not put the Commentaries on James Mill after the end of
the Third like Ms Inge Taubert’s mistaken edition.
Yamanaka’s edition encourages Marx scholars to reconsider the theoretical motives of The Paris
Manuscripts. The philological study should not mislead to assume that The Paris Manuscripts holds
no significance for the formation of Das Kapital . On the contrary, it is the monumental inauguration
of the critique of political economy by Marx. That is why Marx wrote in the Preface to The 1859
Critique that his own critical viewpoint of political economy had been firstly demonstrated in scien-
tific style in The Poverty of Philosophy published in 1847. If the early Marx in 1840s research would
have been fragmental without clear problematic strategy, his remark in the Preface must be some-
thing wrong. What is it? Prof. Levine is too much cautious about The Paris Manuscripts in face of
philological debates over the early manuscripts in including The German Ideology that really hap-
pened, especially in Part on Feuerbach, as the first tackling of Marx’s (and Engels’) historiography
of pre−capitalist forms and primitive accumulation. The Grundrisse includes the second formulation
in the paragraphs titled ‘Forms which precede capitalist production’.
The unique writing order in the Third Manuscripts that starts from critique of political economy
and shifts to that of philosophy and returns to that of political economy, two times in all, justifies the
‘one project’ understanding. For example, the master−slave relationship in Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit is not abandoned after The Paris Manuscripts, not even in the Grundrisse. As Marx demon-
strates in Chapter on Capital in the Grundrisse, where Hegel’s Logic is applies systematically, the
more highly capitalist technology in form of fixed capital of machinery develops where living wage−
workers step up to ‘the general intellect’ as subjective factor of the machinery system, though most
of them remain in simplest laborer attached to huge mechanism, the clearer the wage−workers be-
come conscious of their own capability that they must recover the title with that they open way for
simplest laborers to join the same work ; such strategy prepares the coming post−capitalist society.
That is Marx’s phenomenology that critically succeeds Hegel’s.
4. Marx's Capital and Hegel's Syllogism
4-1. 'Method' and 'system', 'form' and 'content' are separable?
Prof. Levine inaugurates a new Marx research project that stands on separation of ‘form’ and ‘con-
tent’, and that of ‘method’ and ‘system’ and succeeds only the former of form and method. However,
next citation of a foot note from the first edition of Book One of Capital that reads differently, as fol-
lows,
‘It is not surprising that economists who are entirely under the influence of material interest
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have failed to see the meaning of form (Formgehalt) of relative representation of value, while
even professional logicians before Hegel had failed to see the content of form (Forminhalt) of
paradigm of judgment and that of syllogism,’ (Das Kapital , re−publication of the original text of
the first edition, Far Eastern Publishers, 1959, Tokyo, p.21 ; citor’s English translation).
‘Formgehalt’ and ‘Forminhalt’ above give evidence that form and content (or meaning) are separa-
ble and the separation firstly emerges as ideal or theoretical abstraction and they are separated (al-
ienated ) and connected in reified form in practical actuality, as already shown in Marx’s commen-
tary on Aristotle’s De Anima . Marx’s materialism has Aristotelian tradition that attaches greatest im-
portance to ‘cause of matter’ to understand what exists from viewpoint of onto−epistemology. That is
indifferent to Lenin’s ‘reflection’ misunderstanding. Any method is adequate that is able to follow
content that consequently constitutes system of development of form , especially in the case of Marx’s
critique of political economy. Marx rather maximizes the idealistic speculative nature of capitalism in
order to see the outcome. In that sense Marx’s method is rather idealistic, paradoxically that neces-
sitates the study of the continental idealism, especially philosophy of Kant and Hegel to realize
Marx’s approach to capitalism.
4-2. Immediate commodity exchange implies 'Moebius Band'
Immediate exchange of commodity gives typical example between two commodity owners K and
L, where form and content organizes themselves interrelated spirally.
Theoretically, each commodity [CK, CL] ideally separates itself into two attributes of use−value
(content) and exchange−value (form) through exchange relation itself.
Not commodity itself, but its subject, commodity owners of CK and CL unconsciously reverses
the situation in their own self−consciousness in exchange process. They presume self−deceptively
that commodity by nature has two elements of use−value and value, although factually private ex-
change of goods negatively abstracts use−value and positively value, just as Marx remarks in Capital
(Das Kapital , Erster Band, Dietz Verlag Berlin 1962, S.51).
Now, commodity of K [CK] moves from K to L [see → in Figure (I) below] and commodity
of L [CL] from L to K [→], simultaneously. Each movement implies double sense ; not only
movement of use−value but that of exchange−value. That is, movement of [CK] transfers from K to
L, both of use−value of [CK] and exchange−value that exists in [CK] as the price of buying [CL],
and contrastively, movement of [CL] transfers from L to K, both of use−value of [CL] and exchange
−value that exists in [CL] as the price of buying [CK].
Movement [] further divides into both of selling [CK] by K and paying by K the price of buy-
ing [CL], and movement [] into buying [CK] by L and receiving by L the price of selling [CL].
Contrastively, movement [] divides into selling [CL] by L and paying by L the price of buying
[CK], and [] is buying [CL] by K and receiving by K the price of selling [CK].
Two pair moments of ‘selling[,] and buying[,]’ and ‘paying[’,’] and receiving [’,’]’
move contrary directions, progressively and retrospectively.
 selling [CK] by K→ buying [CK] by L
’ paying by K the price of buying [CL] →’ receiving by L the price of selling [CL]
 selling [CL] by L→ buying [CL] by K
’ paying by L the price of buying [CK]→’ receiving by K the price of selling [CK]
Then, let sign ∞ signify transformation into the opposite from selling to buying, or from paying
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【Immediate commodity exchange implies 'Moebius Band'】3
Photograph of
«Moebius Band»
to receiving, and sign double parentheses [[ ]] mean round connection of the four elements, the
four elements reorganize themselves just shown as below.
[K∞→L = L∞→K] (movement of use−value between K and L)
[K’←∞’L=L’←∞’K] (movement of exchange−value between K and L)
Each movement transfers into the opposite form between K and L, from selling to buying, and
paying the price and receiving it, coming back to the starting point. Therefore, commodity exchange
constitutes the topology ‘Moebius Mand’ where movement arrives to the starting point from back-
ward, turning itself 180 degrees two times (cf. two times of ∞). Here in the commodity exchange,
transformation occurs two times each for use−value and exchange−value, then, two times of two
times, that is, four times as shown four ∞ above.
3 See H. Uchida, op. cit., p.28.
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It is very interesting that the next two incidents happened in the same year 1858 ; one when
Marx formulated commodity circuit formula (C…C’) in the last part of the Grundrisse, writing para-
graph of ‘1) Value’, that is de facto ‘commodity as set and element’, and the other when the German
mathematician August Ferdinand Moebius (1790−1868) found ‘Moebius Band’ that was documented
in his note.
By way of demonstration of value−form and exchange−process, commodity breaks into commod-
ity and money. Both are two elemental forms for the movement of capital that necessarily turn into
material production to produce capital in form commodity, returning to the starting form (from sim-
ple commodity to commodity capital). Thus, Marx’s Capital develops into system of commodity
(capital) circuit. Marx’s method is not one−way progressive just as commonly misunderstood, but
doubly progressive−retrospective in movement of use−value and exchange−value, as proved above. His
focus of description shifts from one form to next, formulating syllogism, from simple commodity, to
money as potential capital, to conditions of production in form of commodity, to production , and to
commodity capital (C―M―C [Lp+Pm]…P…C’) (here, Lp signifies labor−power ; Pm, means of pro-
duction).
It is noteworthy that, for commodity−owners, commodity−exchange essentially takes no time, nor
space, because commodity exchange happens ideally in their mind in instant . Actual trade to carry
out needs real time and commodity generally moves in space. The two is essentially different, but is
interrelated in actuality. Here is readable Kantian parallogism that counterfeits ideality of the tran-
scendental thinking Subject to be reality of its existence, just like Descartes’ cogito ergo sum . That is
why Marx writes in The 1859 Critique of Political Economy, both are possible coexist of what is one
to another in space (Nebeneinander), and what is one after the other in time (Nacheinander), just
as already mentioned.
4-3. Prof. Levine's Pair of 'Universality-Particularity'
Prof. Levine proposes the pair of Universality and Particularity to make analysis of Capital . How-
ever, there are two problems.
The first is whether or not, it is necessary to make distinction between Generality and Universal-
ity. The German word ‘die Allgemeinheit’ in Marx’s usage signifies something that has not estab-
lished its own purpose (telos) that matches to the term Generality, and the term Universality is
what is established its own end that Aristotle calls entelecheia . That is universality. Things in capital-
ism are not entelecheia for the Aristotelian Marx ; they are rather in process of being unfinished or
in ‘pre−history’.
The second is that Prof. Levine’s pair lacks ‘Individuality (die Einzelheit)’. Just shown in the
Grundrisse Marx utilizes Hegel’s syllogism of Generality, Particularity and Individuality to constitute
‘Chapter on Capital’, just like the present reviewer showed in his Marx’s Grundrisse and Hegel’s Logic,
Routledge 1988. Prof. Levine does never mention the Grundrisse in his recent book, Marx’s Dis-
course with Hegel . Marx did discourse with Hegel in the Grundrisse, systematically. Instead, Prof.
Levine leaps from The Paris Manuscripts, over the Grundrisse, to Capital . The Grundrisse is the
definitely unescapable mediation of The Paris Manuscripts and Capital . Moreover, Marx writes to
Engels in his letter of January [about 16] 1858 (MEW, Bd.29, p.259) that his re−reading of Hegel’s
Logic is very effective to writing the Grundrisse.
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4-4. Hegel's syllogism in Marx's Capital
Hegel’s syllogism consists of three moments, Individuality (die Einzelheit), Particularity (die Be-
sonderheit) and Generality (die Allgemeinheit). Three figures are shown as follows.
Figure 1) Individuality→Particularity→Generality [F1 (I−P−G)]
Figure 2) Generality→Individuality→Particularity [F2 (G−I−P)]
Figure 3) Particularity→Generality→Individuality [F3 (P−G−I)]
On the other, ‘process of production of commodity capital’ is shown as follows.
C―M―C(Lp+Pm)•••P•••C’―M’―C(Lp+Pm)•••P•••C’
[where C : commodity, M : money, Lp : labor power, Pm : production means, P : production, C’ :
commodity capital, M’ : money capital.]
For reference, Marx makes a short comment in The 1859 Critique (MEW, Bd. 13, p.76) on corre-
spondence of Marx’s formula of capital circuit to Hegel’s syllogism, as below,
‘Commodity―money―commodity can be reduced abstractly in logic into [Hegel’s] syllogism
form of Particularity―Generality―Individuality, where Particularity takes form of the first ex-
treme, Generality joins as medium both extremes together and Individuality sets itself on the
last extreme.’(MEW, vol. 13, p.76)
Then, Commodity corresponds to Particularity [C=P], Money to Generality [M=G], Conditions of
production (Labor power and Production means) and Production itself to Individuality [C(Lp+
Pm)•••P=I].




The syllogism reveals how Marx’s Capital constitutes syllogistic structure that is hidden in eco-
nomic terms. Three figures of the syllogism enchain spiral system through all the three books
(Bücher, not volumes [Bände]) of Capital . Circuit of capital in each book of Capital corresponds to
pairs of figures, as below.
Book I of Capital (circuit of commodity from simple commodity to capital commodity)
(C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−C’)
F3[C’−M’−C[Lp+Pm]•••P] F1[C(Lp+P)•••P•••C’−M’] F2[M’−C(Lp+Pm)•••P•••C’]
Part 1 of Book II (circuit of money capital)
(M−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−M’)
F2 [M’−C(Lp+Pm)•••P•••C’] F3[C’−M’−C[Lp+Pm])•••P] F1[C(Lp+P)•••P•••C’−M’]
Part 1 of Book II (circuit of production capital)
(P−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−P)
F1[P•••C’−M’] F2[M’−C(Lp+Pm)•••P•••C’] F3 [C’−M’−C[Lp+Pm])•••P]
Part 1 of Book II (circuit of commodity capital)
(C’ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−C’)
[F3 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−F1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−F2]
Part 2 of Book II (turnover of capital)
(P−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−P)
F1[P•••C’−M’] F2[M’−C(Lp+Pm)•••P•••C’] F3 [C’−M’−C[Lp+Pm])•••P]




Book III as a whole
(circuit of commodity capital in term of production price)
(C’ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−C’)
[F3 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−F1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−F2]
Commodity capital circuit [C(’)−−−−−C’] is basically common formula to each book of Capital .
Then, Capital begins with commodity and ends in the same form. The whole system of Capital or-
ganizes itself in continuity by Hegel’s syllogism.
In short, Marx’s Capital constitutes of syllogism as below. 4







[F1→F2→F3] [F2→F3→F1] [F3→F1→F2] (figures in vertical)
Basic formula of Capital is C’−−−C’ that unites both circuits of M−−−M’ as valorization and P−−−P
as expanding use−value production that physically mediates the valorization and constitutes of the
whole system in the three volumes of Capital
As shown above, progress of figures in horizontal ‘time order’ correspondingly reappears in retro-
gress of figures in vertical ‘space order’. Both are possible to coexist only in capitalist idealistic per-
spective for valorization. Center figure of each circuit takes role of mediation ; for instance, in the
circuit of commodity capital, F1 mediates both the first extreme F3 and the last F2. Each of the
first extreme figure moves retrospectively (F3→F2→F1) and prospectively in each circuit (F3→F1→
F2 ; F2→F3→F1 ; F1→F2→F3), simultaneously. The reversely double spiral in progress and retro-
gress expresses development of the principal movement of simple commodity exchange that
matches with ‘Moebius Band’, just as shown above [4−2]. The advancement in each circuit results
in retreat that returns at last to the first starting figure. The successions through figures are not im-
mediate, but spirally reverse movement that mediates structure of【set→[element=set→(element)]】,
for instance,【F1→F2→F3 [F2→F3→F1 (F3→F1→F2)]】. The central pair of figures [F2→F3→F1]
is, on one side, set that includes the last pair [F3→F1→F2] as element and the central pair itself is
4 Audience who has basic knowledge of Group Theory in mathematics may see through ‘isomorphism’ between
Marx’s formularization of circuit of commodity capital and Hegel’s syllogism. In order to match in the formu-
larization, Topology of ‘Moebius band’ that is applied to Marx’s Logic Space must develop to Group Theory
where topological ‘element’ becomes moment of ‘permutation’ and ‘set’ is redefined as ‘group’ that maintains
its structure by self−reproducing or reflection (Rückbeziehung). The present reviewer is preparing to prove in
his coming article that Marx’s critique of political economy systematically bases its theoretical structure with
the same kind of logic as Group Theory, although Marx did not know the two founders of Group Theory,
Niels Henrik Abel (1802−1829) and Évariste Galois (1811−1832).
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element included in another set of the first pair [F1→F2→F3]. Further, not only each pair of fig-
ures, but each figure itself is simultaneously both set and element, for instance, the central F3 of
the pair [F2→F3→F1] is such doubly defined existence. Marx’s Capital is syllogism of syllogisms
that continues logically in infinity, just as capitalism seems eternal existence. Commodity that gives
rise syllogism of three figures is both set and element, just as written in the first paragraph of Book
One of Capital as below,
‘The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, appears (er-
scheint) ‘as a huge set of commodity’ (als ‘ein ungehuere Warensammlung’), each commod-
ity being as its elemental form (als ein Elementarform).’ (Das Kapital , Erster Band, Dietz
Verlag Berlin, 1962, p.49 ; Capital , vol.I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p.35 ; citation in
English partially altered, bold letter citor)
As well−known in topology, set of set that does not include itself as element is ‘empty set φ’, just
in the same way as in Hegel’s syllogism. Circuit of commodity capital is ‘empty set’ that does not in-
clude itself, but includes ‘two empty sets’ as elements of circuit of money capital and that of produc-
tion capital. Marx’s Capital is the theory of capitalist global valorization grounded on ‘empty set’ of
(C’−−−C’) that syllogistically includes ‘two empty sets’ as elements of (M−−−M’) and (P−−−P).
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